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DOROTHY BUCKLEY et al., Appellants, v. FRED D. 
CHADWICK, Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Oase.-Where 
imputed negligence was not pleaded as a defense in a wrongful 
death action but the case was tried on the theory that the 
pleading was sufficient in this respect, and where plaintiffs 
made no objection to evidence relating to negligence of agents 
of the deceased, plaintiffs will be deemed to have waived the 
alleged pleading defect. 
[2] Id.-Record-Review as Affected by Oontents of Record.-In 
an action against an owner of a crane for wrongful death 
which occurred when the boom cable of the crane which de-
ceased and his partner had rented broke, plaintiffs could not 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 132; [2] Appeal 
and Error, § 471; [3] Negligence, § 150; [4] Joint Adventurers, § 5; 
[5] Partnership, § 50; [6,7] Negligence, § 33; [8,12,13,15] Death, 
§39; [9,11] Death,§13; [10] Statutes, §191; [14] Statutes, §185; 
[16] Courts, §85; [171 Jury, § li3; (18) Appeal and Error, 
§ 1524-1. 
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successfully urge that there was no evidence that the oiler on 
the crane was an agent or elllploye of the partnership or of de-
ccnned where, in addition to the rental contract provision that 
the partnership furnish an experienced oiler in operation of 
the crane, the settled statement prepared by plaintiffs recited 
• that, at the time of the accident, such crane was being operated 
by the partnership through deceased's partner and such oiler, 
where deceased's partner testified that he had an oiler on the 
job, where the trial judge stated in his opinion denying plain-
tills' motion for new trial that the case was tried on the 
assumption that such agency existed, and whore plaintiffs on 
appeal failed to point out or provide a record of any evidence 
which would support a finding that the oiler was other than 
an employe or agent of the partnership. 
[3] Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact-Scope of Employ-
ment.-In an action against an owner of a crane for wrongful 
death which occurred when the boom cable of the crane which 
deceased and his partner had rented broke, where the settled. 
statement and testimony given by such partner established that 
any negligence of partner or an oiler in operation of the 
crane was in the scope of their employment on behalf of the 
partnership, there was no error in not SUbmitting to the jury 
the issue of scope of employment. 
[4] Joint Adventurers-Liability to Third Persons.-The negli-
genCQ of one joint venturer or of his employe acting in con-
nection with the joint venture is imputed to the other joint 
venturers. 
[5] Partnership-Relation With Third Persons-Liability for Tort.. 
-Any negligence of a partner or an agent of the partnership 
is imputed to another partner. 
[6] Negligence-Contributory Negligence.-The defense of contrib-
utory negligence is not of statutory creation. 
[7] ld.-Contributory Negligence.-It is the rule of the civil and 
of the common law that one who by his own negligence has 
brought an injury on himself cannot recover damages for it. 
[8] Death-Actions for Wrongful Death-Defenses-Contributory 
Negligence.-If Civ. Code, § 1714, relating to responsibility for 
willful acts and negligence, be taken as generally definitive of 
contributory negligence, there is nothing in it which precludes 
application in wrongful death cases. 
[9] ld.-Actions for Wrongful Death-Construction of Code Pro-
[5] See Cal.Jur., Partnership, § 66; Am.Jur., Partnership, § 190 
et seq. 
[6] See CalJur .. Negligence, i 74 e~ &eq.i Am.J'ur .. N~li~enee, 
1174 it ~ 
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visions.-The cause of action created by the wrongful death 
statute is not for the injured person but is for his heirs or 
next of kin to compensate fo&r their pecuniary loss resulting 
from their economic relationship to, and the wrongful death 
of, the injured person, and hence plaintiffs are not persons 
injured as contemplated by Civ. Code, § 1714, but are persons 
who have suifered consequential damage ensuing from the 
death of the person injured. 
[10] Statutes-Construction of Codes.-The language of Civ. Code, 
§ 1714, relating to responsibility for willful acts and negligence, 
is substantially the same as the general rule of the common 
law, and hence is to be construed as a continuation thereof, 
not as a new enactment. (Civ. Code, § 5.) 
[l1a, lIb] Death-Actions for Wrongful Death-Construction of 
Statute.-Inasmuch as the substance of Lord Campbell's Act, 
relating to compensating families of persons killed by acci-
dents, was adopted in California without qualifying applicatory 
rules, it is to be presumed that the Legislature acted in the 
light of the contemporary construction of that act, together 
with the rules which were being applied to actions on it and 
defenses thereto. 
[12] Id.-Actions for Wrongful Death-Defenses-Contributory 
Negligence.-Contributory negligence of the decedent as a 
defense in wrongful death actions is as old as Lord Campbell's 
Act, and it is presumed that the adoption of the substance 
of such statute in California was with knowledge of the 
English decisions pertinent to application of the law. 
[13] Id.-Actions for Wrongful Death-Defenses-Contributory 
Negligence.-Whether the origin of the contributory negligence 
rule in wrongful death cases is viewed as being sound in law 
and reason or as being questionable in both, the rule itself has 
emerged as progenerate in its own right. 
[14] Statutes-Presumptions-Legislative Knowledge.-In adopt-
ing legislation the Legislature is presumed to have had knowl-
edge of existing domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted 
and amended statutes in the light of such decisions as have 
a direct bearing on them. 
[15] Death-Actions for Wrongful Death-Defenses-Contribu-
tory Negligence.-The rule is established in this state that in 
wrongful death actions contributory negligence on the part 
of the deceased is defensive matter and, when shown, will bar 
recovery. 
[16] Courts-Rules of Practice and Procedure.-The broad power 
of a judge to control the proceedings before him does not go 
80 fa.r Wi to warrant an euctioll contrary to law. 
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[l7J Jury-Peremptory Challenges.-The right to challenge a 
certain number of jurors peremptorily is absolute under the 
statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 601), and the fact that a party 
has ouce passed the jury, including the juror afterward sought 
to be challenged, does not cut off this right. 
[I'n] Appsal-llarmless En-or-Jury.-WherE' the record shows 
that a peremptory challenge was taken and erroneously dis-
allowed as to one juror only, and that the jurors were unani- . 
mous in their verdict, and appellant has made no affirmative 
showing that any of the Jurors who were actually ~jworn and 
served in the trial of the cause were biased, prejudiced or 
unfit to scrv~ as trial jurors, and where it docs not appear that 
by reason of the manner in which the jury was selected the 
app~llant did not have a fair and impartial trial or, in the 
light of the entire record, that error in the selection of 
the ,jurors resulted in a miscarriage of justice, such error fur-
nishes no ground for reversal of the judgment. (Const., 
art. VI, § 4%.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Allen 'V. Ashburn, JUdge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for wrongful death. Judgment for 
defendant affirmed. 
Russell H. Pray, Block & Dunbar, Samuel P. Block and 
Eric A. Rose for Appellants. 
Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee and William C. Wetherbee 
for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-In this wrongful death action plaintiffs, the 
surviving widow and minor son of Allen Buckley, deceased, 
appeal from an adverse judgment entered upon a jury ver-
dict. During the trial the widow waived in favor of the son 
her rights to the proceeds of any recovery. We have con-
cluded that plaintiffs' various contentions furnish insufficient 
grounds for reversal, and that the judgment should be af-
firmed. 
The record on appeal consists of a clerk's transcript. and 
a settled statement, prepared by plaintiffs, of oral proceedings 
at the trial. (See rule 7, Rules on Appeal, 36 Ca1.2d 8.) The 
statement comprises in part a narration of numerous facta 
[17] Peremptory challenge after acceptance of juror, note, 3 
A.L.B..2d 499. See also Cal.Jur. Jury, § 107; Am.Jur., Jury, § 19L 
Oct. 1955] BUCKLEY tJ. CHADWICK 
[45 C.2d 183; 288 P.2d 12. 289 P.2d 242] 
]87 
and in part verbatim extracts "from a partial reporter's 
transcript of oral proceedings." From sl!ch statement it 
appears that the decedent, Allell Buckley, was in the business 
of contracting for the furnisl1ing of dirt and other materials 
on construction jobs. He owned two dump trucks and rented 
. at various times cranes and other equipment necessary in 
his business. On March 16, 1951, he and one McDonald en-
tered into a partnership with each other to furnish certain 
dirt on a construction site for a third party and agreed to 
equal division of the profits. On the same day the two part-
ners rented from defendant, also in the contracting business, 
a drag line crane, without an operator and on a "bare rental 
basis. U The lease contract, which was oral, "provided that 
said partnership provide an experienced oiler in the operation 
of the crane and also that Mr. McDonald would operate it." 
Defendant stated at that time that the crane was in first class 
condition and had been worked on since it came off the last 
job. McDonald transported the crane to a dirt pit where 
the partnership used it for the loading of dump trucks. 
On April 19, 1951, while McDonald was operating the crane 
to deposit dirt in a dump truck, the boom cable of the crane 
broke and the boom fell, striking and killing Buckley, who 
was standing on the running board of the truck. The one-half 
inch boom cable broke inside the cab of the drag line crane 
at a place on the cable that was rolled on, around, and off the 
drum as the boom was raised and lowered in operation. 
The evidence conflicts sharply concerning what caused the 
cable to break. The settled statement recites that "At the 
time of the accident said crane was being operated and main-
tained by said partnership through Mr. McDonald and said 
oiler" provided by the partnership. There was expert testi-
mony that at the point of break the cable had been worn and 
defective for some time and was "worn out a long time ago," 
and that such condition could not have developed during the 
period the partnership had used the crane. Conflicting evi. 
dence was that defendant Chadwick and his mechanic had 
inspected the cable closely before renting. it out to the part. 
nership and that it was then in good condition. McDonald 
testified that it was the oiler's duty to "oil the machine" 
but it was not his duty to inspect the cable and that ,if a 
strand of the cable "is broken in view, either I or the oiler 
would have caught it," while defendant's expert witnesses 
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day alld oiled it at intervals, and, further, that "the ends 
of t he broken cable .•• where the break occurred showed 
abrasive damage resulting from faulty winding and unwind-
ing" of the cable and that "if McDonald and the oiler had 
allowed the cable to cross-wind or overlap on the drum during 
tlie six days they were using the crane, enough damage could 
have been done in one second of use under strain to have 
caused the cable to break." 
Plaintiffs' complaint is framed in two counts, one for an 
alleged breach of warranty and the other for alleged negli-
gence of defendant crane owner. Defendant answered with 
a general denial, and also pleaded contributory negligence of 
the deceased, and unavoidable accident. As grounds requiring 
reversal of the judgment in defendant's favor plaintiffs urge 
error in jury instructions, and also that the court erroneously 
prevented the exercise of peremptory challenges by plaintiffs 
in the selection of the jury. 
The court instructed the jury that negligence on the part 
of the deceased Buckley or of his agent which proximately 
contributed to the death would bar recovery against de-
fendant, that the evidence established that the crane was being 
operated and maintained by agents of the deceased, that 
McDonald was such an agent, that if the jury found "that 
there was any negligence 011 the part of one or both of Buck-
ley's agents, McDonald and the oiler, which contributed in 
any degree as a proximate cause of the accident," then plain-
tiffs could not recover, and that the "reason for the rule is 
that the negligence of an agent within the course and scope 
of his employment is imputed to his principal." 
[1] In reliance upon Campagna v. Market St. By. Co. 
(1944), 24 Cal.2d 304, 307 [149 P.2d 281] (see also Bennetf 
v. Cltanslor &- Lyon Co. (1928), 204 Cal. 101, 105 [266 P. 
803] ; Bencich v. Market St. Ry. Co. (1937), 20 Cal.App.2d 
518, 526 [67 P.2d 398]), plaintiffs first contend that the in-
structions as to imputed negligence were erroneous because 
such defense was not pleaded in defendant's answer and there-
fore was not in issue. Plaintiffs first raised the point, however, 
on their motion for new trial, and the case was tried through-
out upon the theory that the pleading was sufficient in this 
respect. Further, the record on appeal discloses no objection 
by plaintiffs to evidence relating to negligence of agents of the 
deceased. Under such circumstances, plaintiffs will be deemed 
to have waived the alleged pleading defect. (See Miller v. 




oct. 1955] BUCKLEY V. CHADWICK 
[45 C.2d 183; 288 P.2d 12, 289 P.2d 242] 
189 
Jonas (1948), 31 Ca1.2d 586, 605 [191 P.2d 432]; Hinkle 
v. Southern Pac. 00. (1939), 12 Ca1.2d 691, 701 [87 P.2d 
349]; Swink v. Gardena Olub" (1944), 65 Cal.App.2d 674, 
680-681 [151 P.2d 313]; Simpson v. Bergmann (1932), 125 
Cal.App. 1, 5-6 [13 P.2d 531] ; Resetar v. Leonardi (1923), 
61 Cal.App. 765, 767 [216 P. 71].) 
[2] Plaintiffs also urge that there was no evidence that the 
oiler was an agent, servant or employe of the partnership 
or of the deceased. In addition to the rental contract provi-
sion that the partnership furnish an experienced oiler in 
the operation of the crane, the settled statement prepared by 
plaintiffs recites as indicated above that "At the time of the 
accident said crane was being operated and maintained by 
said partnership through Mr. McDonald and said oiler." 
McDonald, as a witness for plaintiff, testified, "Q. Did you 
have someone else working there' A. I had an oiler. Q. And 
was he on the job as long as you were on the job' A. Yes." 
Also, the trial judge in his memorandum opinion upon deny-
ing plaintiffs' motion for a new trial (which opinion is in-
cluded in the settled statement) wrote that "the case was 
tried and argued upon the assumption that such agency 
existed," and that counsel for plaintiffs, when requested on 
oral argument to indicate "evidence pointing to any infer-
ence other than the agency of the oiler . • • could point to 
none. " Plaintiffs do not claim such statements of the trial 
judge are incorrect, and on appeal have failed to point 
out or provide a record of any evidence which would support 
a finding that the oiler was other than an employe or agent 
of the partnership. Their contention on this point thus pro-
vides no ground for reversal. (See Brokaw v. Black-Foze 
Military Institute (1951), 37 Ca1.2d 274, 280 [231 P.2d 816] ; 
Philbrook v. Randall (1924), 195 Cal. 95, 104 [231 P. 739] ; 
Bacon v. Grosse (1913), 165 Cal. 481, 490 [132 P. 1027]; 
Cutting Fruit Packing 00. v. Oanty (1904), 141 Cal. 692, 
695-696 [75 P. 564] ; 4 Cal.Jur.2d 426, § 559, and cases there 
cited.) [3] The quoted statements and testimony also estab-
lish that any negligence by McDonald or the oiler in opera-
tion of the crane was in the scope of their employment on 
behalf of the partnership; thus no error is shown in not 
submitting to the jury the issue of scope of employmeJlt. 
Plaintiffs next urge that any negligence of an agent of the 
deceased is not imputable to an heir in a wrongful death 
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negligence on the part of the deceased or of his agent proxi-
mately contributed to the death, then recovery was barred. 
[4] Very recently, after first pointing out the general prin-
ciple that "The relationship of joint venturers is that of a 
m.utual agency, akin to a limited partnership," we held that 
"the negligence of one joint venturer or of his employes 
acting in connection with the joint venture is imputed to the 
other joint venturers." (Leming v. Oilfields Trucking 00. 
(1955), 44 Ca1.2d 343, 350 [282 P.2d 23].) [5] Applying 
the same rule here, it follows that any negligence of the 
partner McDonald or the oiler, an agent of the partnership, 
would be imputed to Buckley. 
Plaintiffs also contend, in reliance upon a challenging article 
appearing in 42 California Law Review 310, authored by 
the learned Judge Paul Nourse of the Los Angeles Superior 
Court, that in any event contributory negligence (whether 
of the deceased, or imputed to him) is not a defense in a 
wrongful death action. Meeting the challenge, defendant 
urges, is the opinion of the equally learned trial judge de-
livered upon denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial in 
this case, holding that the law is definitely settled to the 
contrary. Since the origin, development and acceptance of 
the rule recognizing contributory negligence of the decedent 
as a defense in wrongful death actions has not heretofore been 
extensively explored by this court, we give it our attention. 
Before 1862 there was no wrongful death action in this 
state. (Kramer v. San Francisco Market Street R. Co. (1864), 
25 Ca1. 434, 435.) In that year the Legislature, following 
the philosophy of Lord Campbell's Act, l and to a substantial 
1Lord Campbell's Act: "An Act; for compensating the Families of 
Persons killed by Accidents. [26th August 1846.] 
"WHEREAS no Action at Law is now maintainable against a Person 
who by his wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default may have caused the Death 
of another Person, and it is oftentimes right and expedient that the 
Wrongdoer in such Case should be answerable in Damages for the Inju17 
so caused by him: Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent 
Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and 
Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by 
the Authority of the same, That whensoever the Death of a Person shall 
be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default, and the Act, Neglect, or 
Default is such as would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the 
Party injured to maintain an action and recover Damages in respect 
thereof, then and in every such Case the Person who would have been 
liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an Action for Damages, 
notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured, and although the 
Death shall hav~ been caused under such Circumstances as amount in Law 
W Felony. 
u U. And be it eaacted, ThAt Qveq such AC;tioJL shall be fo~ the bGd* 
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extent its phraseology, created such a cause of action. (Stats. 
1862, p. 447.) Like Lord Campbell's Act (set out in material 
part in the margin), it provided (in section 1) that "When-
ever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, 
neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default, is such 
as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party 
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect 
thereof, then, •.• the person who ... would have been liable 
if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, 
notwithstanding the death of the person injured . . ." 
In the interest of accuracy, and to dispel a misconcep-
tion which has found its way into some writings, herein-
after mentioned in more detail, it should be noted that the 
quoted language of section 1 (which is almost identical with 
the language of the original Lord Campbell's Act) does not 
expressly make the right to recover dependent on the absence 
of contributory negligence on the part of the decedent. Such 
language (and the same may be said of Lord Campbell's Act) 
indicates no design by the Legislature to state a rule either 
of requirement that plaintiff show as a part of his case that 
the decedent was free of contributory negligence, or that 
contributory negligence of the decedent should or should not 
be available as a defense. It makes no reference whatsoever 
to the conduct of the injured person (the decedent) or to 
his ultimate right to recover if he had survived. In terms it 
requires only that "the act, neglect, or default" of the tort-
feasor be such as would "have entitled the party injured to 
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof." 
Obviously, it does not state that the conduct of "the party 
of the Wife, Husband, Parent, and Child of the Person whose Death shall 
have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the Name of the 
Executor or Administrator of the Person deceased; and in every such 
Action the Jury may give such Damages as they may think proportioned 
to the Injury resulting from such Death to the Parties respectively for 
whom and for whose Benefit such Action shall be brought; and the 
Amount so recovered, after deducting the Costs not recovered from the 
Defendant, shall be divided amongst the before-mentioned Parties ill 
Buch Shares as the Jury by their Verdict shall find and direct. 
"III. Provided always, and be it enacted, That not more than One 
Action shall lie for and in respect of the same Subject Matter of Com· 
plaint, and that every such Action shall be commenced within Twelve 
Calendar Months after the Death of such deceased Person. 
"IV. And be it enacted, That in every such Action the Plaintiff 011 the 
Record shall be required, together with tIle Declaration, to deliver to the 
Defendant or his Attorney a full Particular of the Person or Persons for 
whom and on whose Behalf such Action shall be brought, and of the 
Nature of the Claim in respect of which Damages shall be Souiht to be 
recovered. • •• " .f,.9 & 10 Viet., ch. 93, pp. 531·532.) 
) 
) 
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injured" must have been free from contributory negligence 
or that such negligence on his part should or should not COll-
stitute a defense to the cause of action created. Thus the 
Legislature did not negate its ordinarily to be presumed ac-
ceptance of the contemporary construction by the courts of 
the similar language in Lord Campbell's Act, hereinafter 
discussed, but left the courts of this state free to interpret 
and apply the statute in the light of the common law as it 
might appear in this field. 
[6] Another misconception appears to be that section 1714 
of the Civil Code creates, and by its language limits, the 
defense of contributory negligence. (See 42 Cal.L.Rev. 312.) 
But the defense of contributory negligence is not of statutory 
creation. [7] As was stated by the United States Supreme 
Court at least as long ago as 1877, "One who by his negli-
gence has brought an injury upon himself cannot recover 
damages for it. Such is the rule of the civil and of the 
common law." (Baltimore w P. R. Co. v. Jones (1877), 95 
U.S. 439, 442 [24 L.Ed. 506).) [8] But even if we take 
section 1714 as generally definitive of contributory negligence 
in California, we find nothing in it which precludes applica-
tion in wrongful death cases. The section reads: "Everyone 
is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but 
also for an injury occasioned to anotht:r by his want of ordi-
nary care or skill in the management of his property or person, 
except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary 
care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability 
in such cases is defined by the title on compensatory relief." 
[9] Clearly, the "injury occasioned to another" which is 
spoken of in section 1714 is the injury to the person who is 
the victim of the actor's negligence. As pertinent in a wrong-
ful death case, the "injury occasioned to another" has caused 
the death of the victim; the cause of action created by the 
wrongful death statute is not for the injured person but is 
for his heirs or next of kin to compensate for their pecuniary 
loss resulting from their economic relationship to, and the 
wrongful death of, the injured person. The plaintiffs are 
not persons injured as contemplated by the statute; they 
are persons who have suffered consequential damage ensuing 
from the death of the person injured. Thus section 1714, 
like the wrongful death statute, is completely silent on the 
question of contributory negligence as a defense to actions 
brought under the latter act. [10] Insofar as the language 
of section 1714 is cOllcel'lled it is substantially the same as 
.. ) 
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the general rule of the common law and, hence, is to be 
construed as a continuation thereof, not as a new enactment. 
(Civ. Code, § 5.) .& 
[lla] However, it can be urged, and properly so, that since 
the substance of Lord Campbell's Act was adopted in Cali-
fornia without qualifying applicatory rules it is to be strongly 
presumed that the Legislature acted in the light of the con-
temporary construction of that act (see 50 Am.Jur. 309-311, 
§ 319), together with the rules which were being applied to 
actions upon it and defenses thereto (see Holmes v. McOolgan 
(1941), 17 Ca1.2d 426, 430 [110 P.2d 428] ; Union Oil Asso-
ciates v. Johnson (1935), 2 Ca1.2d 727, 735 [43 P.2d 291, 
98 A.L.R. 1499]; Estate of Potter (1922), 188 Cal. 55, 68 
[204 P. 826]). [12] In respect to contributory negligence 
of the decedent as a defense in such actions there can be no 
doubt that the rule is as old as the act. Lord Campbell's Act 
was enacted in 1846. In 1849 the Court of Common Pleas 
had before it several cases in which negligence and contrib-
utory negligence were issues and in one of which ('l'horogood 
v. Bryan (1849), 8 C.B. 115, 65 E.C.L. 115, 137 English Re-
print 452 (Common Pleas Book 15» the action was based 
on Lord Campbell's Act. The report of the case relates, "The 
first of these was an action upon the case brought by the 
plaintiff Sarah Thorogood, as administratrix of her late hus-
band . . . under the statute 10 Vic. c. 93, to recover damages 
against the defendant for negligently causing the intestate'8 
death 0 • 0 [Po 453.] The learned judge told the jury, that, 
if they were of opinion that • • • want of care on the part 
of the driver of Barber's [deceased's] omnibus in not drawing 
up to the kerb to put the deceased down, or any want of care 
on the part of the deceased himself, had been conducive to 
the injury, in either of thosecases,-notwithstanding the de-
fendant (by her servant) had been guilty of negligence, their 
verdict must be for the defendant." It was held that the 
instruction properly stated the law and the judgment for 
defendant was affirmed. 
Some 10 years later (in Senior v. Ward (1859), 1 E. & E. 
385, 102 E.C.L. 385, 120 English Reprint (King's Bench, 
Book 49) 954) we find Lord Campbell, himself, as Chief 
Justice, speaking for the Queen's Bench and declaring the 
law applicable to an action upon the statute in question. "The 
report tells us: (P. 954.) "At the trial, before Cockburn 
C.J 0, at the last Summer ~es for Derbyshire, it appeared 
~c.ad-I 
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that the aetion was brought, under stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, 
by the plaintiff, a widow, to recover damages for the death 
of her son, John Senior, who was accidentally killed while 
in the employ of the defendant .••• [Po 956.] Lord Camp-
bell C.J. now delivered the judgment of the Court. We are 
• of opinion that the rule to enter the verdict in this case for 
the defendant or to enter a nonsuit must be made absolute. 
The authorities upon the subject are all collected and com-
mented upon in The Bartollshill Coal Co. v. Reid (3 Macq.App. 
Ca. 266). According to these authorities, the action would 
not have been maintainable if the deceased had come to his 
death purely from the negligence of his fellow servants em-
ployed in the same work with him. However, a strong case 
of negligence on the part of the defendant, as contributing 
to the death, has been made out; and, if an answer had not 
been given to this case, by shewing negligence on the part 
of the deceased which contributed to his death, we think the 
defendant ought to have been held liable •••. [Po 957.] 
We conceive that the Legislature, in passing the statute on 
which this action is brought, intended to give an action to 
the representatives of a person l~illed by negligence only 
where, had he survived, he himself, at the common law, could 
have maintained an action against the person guilty of the 
alleged negligence. Under the circumstances of this case, 
could the deceased, if he had survived, have maintained an 
action against the defendant for what he suffered from the 
accidentY We think that he could not: for, although the 
negligence of the defendant might have been an answer to 
the defence that the accident was chiefly caused by the negli-
gence of a fellow servant, the negligence of the plaintiff him-
self, which materially contributed to the accident, would, upon 
well established principles, have deprived him of any remedy. 
Volenti non fit injuria .••• Judgment for the defendant." 
To the same effect see Witherley v. The Regent's Canal AD. 
(1862), 12 C.B.N.S. 2, 104 E.C.L. 2, 142 English Reprint 
(Common Pleas Book 20) 1041, 1042. 
[lIb] Thus the availability of contributory negligence as a 
defense to wrongful death actions, brought under the statute 
which appears to be the progenitor of the California act, was 
firmly established when California acted. As hereinabove 
indicated, it is to be presumed that such enactment was. 
with knowledge of the English decisions pertinent to ap-
plication of the law. (See llolmes v. McOolgan (1941), 
supra, 17 Cal.2d 426, 430; Union Oil .4ssoc4atu Y. JohmO'll 
) 
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(1935), supra, 2 Ca1.2d 727, 735; Estate of Potter (1922), 
s'upra, 188 Cal. 55, 68; see also 82 C.J.S. 860-863, § 372, and 
cases there cited.) Further examination of the California 
legislation and of the decisions which followed it and its sev-
eral amendments, explains, at least historically, the origin, 
and demonstrates the establishment, of the pertinent rule in 
this state. 
Section 3 of the 1862 California statute provided that the 
action should be brought in the name of the personal repre-
sentative for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of 
kin of the deceased, and that the jury could consider the 
pecuniary injuries resulting to the widow and next of kin 
and award both pecuniary and exemplary damages. Section 2 
of the statute included the statement of a rule which would 
now fit the definition of a presumption (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1959; see also, ide § 1961). It declared that "Whenever 
the death of any person shall be caused by an injury received 
in falling through, or by drowning after having fallen through, 
any opening or defective place in any sidewalk, street, alley, 
or wharf, in any city . . ., the death of such person shall 
be deemed to have been caused by the wrongful neglect and 
default of the person or persons . . • whose duty it was, at 
the time . • . to have kept in repair such sidewalk, street, 
alley, or wharf ••. " 
In 1867 the court was called upon to apply the statute in 
an action (Gay v. Winter, 34 Cal. 153) brought by a surviv-
ing ::ather, as the personal representative, to recover for the 
death of his 5-year-old son, who was alleged to have drowned 
after falling through a hole in the street and thence (p. 154) 
"into the waters of the Bay of San Francisco beneath." 
Defendants moved for a nonsuit on the ground, among others, 
that the evidence affirmatively showed that plaintiff father 
was himself contributively negligent in allowing the deceased 
minor (p. 156) "to go alone about said street crossing, where 
said hole was known to exist." Judgment of nonsuit was 
granted, and on appeal by plaintiff the judgment was re-
versed. That the court considered that contributory negli-
gence of the decedent (or of the plaintiff himself, if estab-
lished) would constitute a bar to recovery is apparent from 
its opinion. It specifically states that (p. 162) "How, far 
the plaintiff was bound to go for the purpose of showing that 
the death of his intestate was not attributable to his own 
negligence, appears to be the principal question in the case. U 
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After then referring to rules that deny recovery to plaintiff 
in a personal injury action (p. 163) "if it appears that his 
own negligence contributed in any degree to the injury which 
he has sustained," it was stated that (pp. 163-164) "In a 
gel1eral sense, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and 
he must undoubtedly make a case, in view of which the jury 
can say that they believe the injury was sustained through 
the fault of the defendant, unaccompanied by any fault on 
the part of the plaintiff,"2 but that such a rule is inadequate 
where plaintiff (p. 164) "is wholly unable to make any proof 
as to his own conduct," and in such event (p. 164) "the 
jury are at liberty to infer ordinary care and diligence on 
the part of the plaintiff from all the circumstances of the 
ca:se-his character and habits and the natural instinct of 
self preservation .••• If the plaintiff makes a case which does 
not charge him with negligence we think his case should be 
allowed to go to the jury. [Citations.] It should have been 
left to the jury to say whether the plaintiff's intestate exer-
cised ordinary care and diligence, under an instruction from 
the Court that if he did not the plaintiff would not be entitled 
to a verdict." 
Although the discussion by the court, as above epitomized, 
appears to refer indiscriminately to contributory negligence 
by the deceased child as well as by the plaintiff father (i.e., 
the personal representative), the opinion clearly indicates 
the views that (1) as a general rule a personal injury plaintiff 
should (p. 164) "make a case which will leave him blameless" 
(cf. May v. Hanson (1855), 5 Cal. 360, 365 [63 Am.Dec. 
135], [" [I] t is not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the 
exercise by him of ordinary care to avoid the injury, but ..• 
the proof of want of it on the part of the plaintiff, lies on 
the defendant; ••• he who avers a fact in excuse of his own 
misfeasance, must prove it"]), and (2) that if unable to 
produce proof of his own or the decedent's conduct then he 
is entitled to the benefit of an "inference" (more properly, 
presumption) of care on his part and (p. 164) "If the plain-
tiff makes a case which does not charge him with negligence 
we think his case should be allowed to go to the jury." It is 
worthy of mention that the holding of the court concerning 
the burden of proof in relation to contributory negligence 
appears to have been reached without reliance on the positive 
'The opinion in this case, 34 Cal. 153, 162·164, 8oDle~ u.eea the word 
.4plaintiJI" as 81IlOD1Dloua with the dcceaaed.. 
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declaration of section 2 of the 1862 statute that the death of 
a person caused by drowning after falling through a hole in 
the street" shall be deemed to have been caused by the wrong· 
ful neglect 71 of those whose duty it was to maintain the street 
in repair. 
In 1872 the 1862 statute was repealed and reenacted as 
section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, reading as follows: 
"When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act 
or neglect of another, his heirs or personal representatives 
may maintain an action for damages against the person caus-
ing the death; or when the death ... is caused oy an injury 
received in falling through any opening or defective place 
in any sidewalk, street, alley, square, or wharf, his heirs or 
personal representatives may maintain an action for damages 
against the person whose duty it was, at the time of the injury, 
to have kept in repair such sidewalk or other place. In every 
such action the jury may give such damages, pecuniary or 
exemplary, as, under all the circumstances of the case, may 
to them seem just." Thus, the reenactment permitted the 
action to be brought by the heirs as well as by the personal 
representatives, deleted the language expressly requiring that 
"the act, neglect, or default •.• [of the tort·fea.sor be] such 
as would (if death had not ensu·ed) have entitled the party 
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect 
thereof," and likewise deleted the positive direction that a 
death caused by falling through a defective sidewalk, wharf, 
or street, etc., "shall be deemed to have been caused by the 
wrongful neglect" of those charged with the repair thereof. 
Two years later (Code Amendments 1873.1874, p. 294) the 
section was again amended; this time the reference to defective 
sidewalks, wharves, streets, etc., was deleted from section 377, 
the cause of action under that section was limited to the 
wrongful death "of a person not being a minor," and actions 
for the wrongful death of a minor were left for treatment 
in section 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
It has been asserted (see 42 Cal.L.Rev. 310) that both Lord 
Campbell '8 Act and the substantially similar 1862 California 
statute "expressly provided that the cause of action should 
only vest in the personal representative of the deceased, if 
the deceased, had he survived, could have maintained an action 
against the tortfeasor,"8 and in reliance upon Gay v. wtnter 
-See also: Prosaer on Torts, p. 96i); 16 Am..J ur. 61, »82; Allnotatioll 
" A.L.B. 14. .. _~ ... 
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(1867), snpra, 34 Cal. 153, that "Under this statute it is 
necessary tltat the plaintiff provc, as a part of his case, not 
only the negligence of the defendant but that tile deceased 
was free from negligence contributing in any degree to the 
i1}jury which resulted in his death. Thus the statute created 
a cause of action in the personal representative only in those 
cascs where the decedent did not, by his own negligence, 
cOlltribute to the injury which resulted in his death." 
However, as we have already noted, the statute is descriptive 
only of the act of the tort feasor; it makes no reference what-
soever to the conduct of the decedent or to his ultimate right 
to recover, as against a defense of contributory negligence, 
if he had survived, and neither does the opinion in Gay v. 
lVinter hold that the statute required a showing of decedent's 
freedom from contributory negligence before a recovery could 
be had. It follows that the further suggestion (42 Cal.L. 
Rev. 311-313) that by omitting from the 1872 cnactment 
of section 377 the provision which assertedly "made the de-
cedent's freedom from negligence a condition upon the cause 
of action which it created," the Legislature intended to remove 
contributory negligence by the deceased as a bar to recovery 
in a wrongful death action, is without merit. In the first 
place, the Legislature had never by any language it used 
"made the decedent's freedom from negligence a condition 
upon the cause of action which it created," and Gay v. Winter 
does not so hold. In the second place, if it had been the 
intention of the Legislature to provide that contributory 
negligence should not defeat recovery, then it could easily and 
clearly have so stated, as has been done in section 37084 of 
the Labor Code (see also Lab. Code, § 2801). Moreover, it 
appears quite as likely that there was an intent, in view of 
the discussion and holding in Gay v. Winter (1867), supra, 
34 Cal. 153, 162-164, to (1) recognize contributory negligence 
as a bar to recovery in defective street, etc., cases, notwith-
standing the presumption theretofore positively declared, and 
(2) more clearly accept contributory negligence as merely 
defensive matter in all wrongful death cases, rather than to 
·Section 3708: "In such action [against the uninsured employer] it is 
presumed that the injury to the employee was a direct result and grew 
out of the negligence of the employer, and the burden of proof is upon 
the employer, to rebut the presumption of negligence. It is not a defense 
to the employer that the employee was guilty of contributory negligence, 
or assumed the risk of the hazard complained of, or that the injury was 
caused by the negligence of a fellow servant. No contract or regulation 
shall restore to the employer any of the fore~oin~ defenses." 
) 
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consider the negation thereof to be a part of plaintiff's case 
in chief, whether it lay in his power to produce evidence 
on the subject or otherwise. .& 
[13] More important to ascertaining the established law 
it appears indisputable that, regardless of whether we view 
the origin of the contributory negligence rule in wrongful 
death cases as being sound in law and reason or as being 
~u~Htionable. in both, the rule itself has emerged as progenerate 
III Its own rIght. From the time California's original wrong-
ful death statute was enacted in 1862, presumptively in the 
light of the English court decisions under Lord Campbell's 
Act, hereinabove discussed, down to the present the California 
cases have consistently and unswervingly followed the rule, 
which likewise has been held to prevail, in the absence of 
express statutory limitation, in most other jurisdictions,5 that 
contributory negligence on the part of the decedent bars recov-
ery in wrongful death actions. (See e.g. of CaHfornia: Gay v. 
Winter (1867), supra, 34 Cal. 153, 164; Glascock v. Central 
Pac. R. Co. (1887), 73 Cal. 137, 141 [14 P. 518] ; Pepper v. 
Southern Pac. Co. (1895), 105 Cal. 389, 399 r38 P. 974]; 
Studer v. Southern Pac. Co. (1898),121 Cal. 400 [53 P. 942, 
66 Am.St.Rep. 39] ; Lemasters v. Southern Pac. Co. (1900), 
131 Cal. 105, 107 [63 P. 128] ; Green v. Southern Cal. Ry. 
Co. (1902), 138 Cal. 1, 2 [70 P. 926] ; Shade v. Bay Counties 
·See 17 Corpus Juris 1242 (and Supple'nents), note 54. for cases cited 
as so holding from the following jurisdictions other than California: 
United States, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iow~l. Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana. 
Maine, Maryland. Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi. 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio. Pennsylvania, Porto Rico, Rhode Island. Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
Cannda, British Columbia, Manitoha, N ova Scotia, Ontario, New· 
foundland. 
To the above list, Corpus Juris Secundum (25 C.J.S. 1140, 1141, ~ 46, 
195!) Pocket Part) adds Nevada and South Dakota and American Juris-
prudence. (16 Am.Jur. 88-89, ~ 130, notes 13 and 14) aods Idaho and 
Oklahoma. 
Corpus Juris Secundum states the rule thus: "In the absence of any 
applicatory statute changing the rule, contributory negligence such as 
would have barred an action by decedent is a good defense to an action 
for his death." (25 C.J.S. 1140, ~ 46; see also eases cited under note 60.) 
American Jurisprudence phrases the rule as follows: "In an action 
for death wrongfully caused by ncglig<:>llce of the oefentlnllt, the !Wneral 
rule is that negligence of the decedent proximately contributing to the 
injury resulting in death harl! l'CC9very in favor of the beneficiaries for 
the loss they have sustained thereby. This is true even where the death of 
the deceased results from the violation by th!' defendant of a duty 
imposed upon him by statutc where the statute pJ'es('nlJillg the duty uoes 
not exclude such defense." (16 Am.Jur. 88·89, § 130.) 
) 
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Power 00. (1907), 152 Cal. 10, 13 [92 P. 62]; Young v. 
Southern Pac. 00. (1920),182 Cal. 369, 375, 383 [190 P. 36J; 
Read v. Pacific Elec. Ry. 00. (1921), 185 Cal. 520, 523 [197 
P. 791J ; Oarroll v. Beavers (1954), 126 Cal.App.2d 828, 832 
[273 P. 56] ; see also Dickmson v. SOll,thern Pac. 00. (1916), 
172 Cal. 727 [158 P. 183] ; Orabbe v. Mammoth Ohannel G. 
Min. 00. (1914), 168 Cal. 500, 504-506 [143 P. 714] ; 8 Cal. 
Jur. 988-989, § 41.) And in 1901 (prior to abolition of the 
fellow-servant doctrine in this state by Stats. 1911, p. 796) 
it was declared in Hedge v. lVilliams, 131 Cal. 455, 457 [63 
P. 721, 64 P. 106, 82 Am.St.Rep. 366], that if the death had 
been caused by negligence of a fellow servant of the deceased, 
then the heirs could not recover against the employer. 
Meanwhile Code of Civil Procedure, section 377 (since the 
enactment in 1872) has been amended three times. In 1901 
(Stats. 1901, p. 126) a provision was added that if the person 
causing the death "is employed by another who is responsible 
for his conduct, then" the action could be maintained "also 
against such other person." In 1935 (Stats. 1935, p. 460) 
the section was extended to cover the wrongful death "of a 
minor person who leaves surviving him either a husband or 
wife or child or children." By the next and most recent 
amendment (Stats. 1949, ch. 1380, § 4) provision was made, 
among other things, for survival of the action in case of death 
of the tort feasor. At no time. however, has contributory 
11egligence been abolished as a defense. [14] It is a gen-
erally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the 
IJegislature is presumed to have had knowledge of existing 
domestic judicial decisions6 and to have enacted and amended 
statutes in the light of such decisions as have a direct bearing 
upon them. (Estate of Oalhoun (1955), 44 Cal.2d 378, 384-
386 [282 P.2d 880] ; People v. Perkins (1951), 37 Ca1.2d 62, 
63 [230 P.2d 353] ; McFadden v. Jordan (1948), 32 Cal.2d 
330, 334 [196 P.2d 787]; Penaat v. Terwilliger (1944), 23 
Ca1.2d 865, 871 [147 P.2d 552]; In re Halcomb (1942), 21 
Ca1.2d 126, 129 [130 P.2d 384]; Whitley v. Superior Oourt 
(1941), 18 Ca1.2d 75, 78 [113 P.2d 449] ; Miller v. McColgan 
(1941), 17 Cal.2d 432, 439 [110 P.2d 419, 134 A.L.R. 1424] ; 
Blodgett v. Supe1'ior Oom·t (1930),210 Cal. 1, 13 [290 P. 293, 
72 A.L.R. 482] : Slocum v. Bear Valley lrr. 00. (1898), 122 
-The rule all :tPl'!lt':ItOI'Y to tIll! dl'ci:;iolls of a foreign jurisdiction from 
which 11 statute ia sulJstantially copied baa already been st.ated., ,v,PrG, 
pp. 193·195. 
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Cal. 555, 556 [55 P. 403, 68 Am.St.Rep. 68] ; see also 23 Cal. 
Jur. 783, § 159; note, 2 D.C.L.A. Law Rev. 269, 271.) 
[15] Under the circumstances which have been related it 
must be recognized that until the Legislature sees fit to pro-
vide otherwise the rule is established in this state that in 
wrongful death actions contributory negligence on the part 
of the deceased is defensive matter and, when shown, will 
bar recovery. 
Finally, plaintiffs contend that they were erroneously pre-
vented by the court from exercising their peremptory chal-
lenges in the selection of the jury. The settled statement 
shows that prior to the trial and in chambers, the trial judge 
informed counsel for both plaintiffs and defendant that the 
practice in his department with respect to waiver of per-
emptory challenges is as follows: "That once an attorney 
has waived any peremptory challenge to the jurors in the 
box, that challenge is gone, so far as those jurors are con-
cerned; that a peremptory can thereafter be exercised only 
with respect to a juror or jurors called into the box after 
the said waiver. They were also told that if either attorney 
were dissatisfied with this method of handling peremptories 
he, being advised in advance of what would happen, should, 
if desiring to make a record, come to the bench and make 
the record outside the hearing of the jurors, so that . . . 
[such attorney] would not be embarrassed by having to chal-
lenge in the presence of the jurors someone sitting in the 
box whom he knew would not be excused." The jury was 
then selected in the following manner: After the jury box 
was filled, plaintiffs exercised four peremptory challenges 
alternately with the defendant and then passed a peremptory 
challenge (plaintiffs' fifth) to the jurors then in the box. 
Defendant then exercised a peremptory challenge to juror 
No.9, and after a new venireman had entered the box plain-
tiffs in open court challenged juror No. 10, who had been 
in the box at the time plaintiffs waived their fifth peremptory. 
The court disallowed this challenge on the ground that the 
juror had been in the box at the time plaintiff had passed 
a peremptory and that their peremptory was now restricted 
to the juror who had been caBed to fill the vacancy created 
by defendant's last exercised peremptory challenge. T~e 
court also reminded counsel of the conference in chambers 
concerning the rule it then proposed to impose in respect to 
the exercise of perelllptorl challenges. Thereupon the at tor-
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ney, by le~ve of court, further interrogated juror No. 10 as 
to the effect upon him of the unsuccessful challenge and there-
after withdrew an exception he had taken to the court's ruling 
and also expressly withdrew his challenge to No. 10. Later, 
the attorneys went to the bench and plaintiffs' attorney pro-
tested that he had forgotten what the court had said in cham-
bers and renewed his exception to the court's ruling on the 
matter. Juror No. 10 remained on the jury throughout the 
case. 
Section 601 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: 
" ... Each side is entitled to six peremptory challenges. 
If no peremptory challenges are taken until the panel is full, 
they must be taken or passed by the sides alternately, com-
mencing with the plaintiff, and -if both sides pass consecutively, 
the jury shall then be sworn, unless the court, for good cause, 
shall otherwise order. Each side shall be entitled to have 
the panel full before exercising any peremptory challenge. 
The 'I.umber of peremptory challenges remaining with a side 
shalt ',lot be diminished by any passing of a peremptory chal-
lenge. H The portions in italics were added in 1953 (Stats. 
1953, ch. 1578, § 1), after the trial of the instant case. 
That plaintiffs were entitled to exercise the peremptory 
challenge which they sought, is clear. [16] The broad 
power of a judge to control the proceedings before him 
does not go so far as to warrant an exaction contrary to law. 
[17] As declared in Silcox v. Lang (1889). 78 Cal. 118. 
123-124 [20 P. 297], "The right to challenge a certain numbt>r 
of jurors peremptorily is absolute under the statute. (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 601.) The fact that the appellant had once 
passed the jury, including the juror afterward sought to be 
challenged, did not cut off this right. The proper practice 
in the selection of a jury in a civil case is to fill the panel, 
and upon one of the jurors being challenged for any cause, 
or 'without cause,' to immediately call another to take his 
place, so that a party, in dt>termining whether to challenge 
or not, may do so with a full panel before him. [Citations.j" 
(See also Taylor v. 'Western Pac. R. Co. (1873), 45 Cal. 323, 
329-332.) Nothing to the contrary appears in Vance v. R1ch-
ardson (1895), 110 Cal. 414 r42 P. 909], where. when the 
pane] was full, defendant-appellant waived" our peremptory 
for the present," and counsp] for plaintiff then stated "I am 
satisfied with the jury." rrhere was in the Vance case uo 
substitution of a new juror for one challenged by respondent. 
such as occuncd in Silco.c v. Lana u.s well as in the case now 
) 
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before us. Vallejo etc. R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co. (1915), 
169 Cal. 545, 559 [147 P. 238], is not here material, as it 
appears to merely hold that nO" error occurred when the 
court permitted plaintiff-respondent to H exercise its remain-
ing peremptory challenge after the panel was filled and all 
the jurors had been examined and passed for cause by both 
parties." (C/. Austin v. Lambert (1938),11 Ca1.2d 73, 79-80 
[77 P.2d 849, 115 A.L.R. 849].) 
[18] However, here as in People v. Estorga (1928), 206 
Cal. 81, 87 [273 P. 575] (see also People v. Hickman (1928), 
204 Cal. 470, 481 [268 P. 909, 270 P. 1117]), the appellant 
"has made no affirmative showing, and does not offer to show, 
that any of the ••. jurors who were actually sworn and 
served in the trial of the cause were biased, prejudiced, or 
in any way unfit to serve as trial jurors; nor does it appear 
that by reason of the manner in which the jury was selected 
the •.• [appellantJ did not have a fair and impartial trial." 
Under such circumstances, and although the method by which 
the jury was selected was erroneous and cannot be approved 
by this court, the error nevertheless does not appear on the 
record before us, which is epitomized on pages 186-188, supra, 
and which also establishes that the jurors were polled and were 
unanimous in their verdict, to have resulted in a miscarriage 
of justice, and hence furnishes no ground for reversal of the 
judgment. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%; see also People v. 
Hoyt (1942), 20 Ca1.2d 306, 318 [125 P.2d 29J; Jackson v. 
Superior Court (1937), 10 Ca1.2d 350, 358 [74 P.2d 243, 113 
A.L.R. 1422] ; Switzler v. Atchison etc. By. Co. (1930), 104 
Cal.App. 138, 151 [285 P. 918J ; People v. Bambaud (1926), 
78 Cal.App. 685, 692 [248 P. 954].) 
For the reasons above stated, the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
TRA YNOR J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in 
the conclusion and reasoning of the majority opinion that 
contributory negligence is a defense in a wrongful death 
action, but I agree with Justice Carter that the trial court 
committed prejudicial error in denying plaintiffs their statu-
tory right to a peremptory challenge. For that reason .r 
would reverse the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agl'ee with the reasoning of the majority that the 
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contributory negligence of a decedent either should, or must, 
be imputed to the heirs of said decedent in a wrongful death 
action. 
The cause of action for wrongful death is wholly statutory; 
it is entirely separate and distinct from any cause of action 
which the decedent (had he lived) might have had (Bo-nd v. 
United Railroads, 159 Cal. 270 [113 P. 366, Ann. Cas. 19120 
50, 48 L.R.A.N.S. 687]; McLaughlin v. United Railroads, 
169 Cal. 494 [147 P. 149, Ann.Cas. 1916D 337, L.R.A. 1915E 
1205] ; Olark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 527 [150 P. 357, L.R.A. 
1916A 1142]). 
The majority opinion, speaking of the three amendments 
to section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, states that " At 
no time, however, has contributory negligence been abolished 
as a defense." Contributory negligence was never specifically 
mentioned by the section as a defense-although the appellate 
courts assumed that contributory negligence on the part of 
the decedent would bar recovery by his heirs or personal 
representative. The language in the original enactment which 
could have been said to imply that the decedent's contributory 
negligence was a defense to an action brought by the personal 
representative was deleted when section 377 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure was enacted giving to the heirs also the right 
to sue. Judge Paul Nourse (42 Cal.L.Rev. 310 et seq.) points 
out that "Upon the grounds that the cause of action for 
wrongful death is a new cause of action and separate and 
distinct from any cause of action that the deceased might 
have had, it has been uniformly held that the admissions of 
the decedent against his interests and which might tend to 
establish his negligellce, are not admissible against his heirs 
in an action brought under Section 377 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure [Hedge v. Will'iams, 131 Cal. 455 [63 P. 721, 64 
P. 106, 82 Am.St.Rep. 366]; Marks v. Reissinger, 35 Cal. 
App. 44, 54 [169 P. 243]]. It seems anomalous to hold that 
the negligence of the decedent will defeat a cause of action 
for his death, and to hold that his own admissions may not 
be used as proof of his negligence. 
"The Legislature not having made the decedent's freedom 
from negligence a condition upon the cause of action which 
it created, the Courts are without power to graft such condi-
tions upon that cause of action. To do so would be to amend 
the statute by judicial decree. [Cal. Const., art. III, § 1 ; 
AUen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184 [30 P. 213, 16 L.R.A. 646] ; Moore 
.... 
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v. United States P. & O. 00., 122 Cal.App. 205 [9 P.2d 562] ; 
Ohester v. Hall, 55 Cal.App. 611, 615 [204 P. 237].]" 
Section 1714 of the Civil Code"is the section which contains 
the defense of contributory negligence. That section provides 
that "Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his 
wilful acts but also for injuries occasioned to another by his 
want of ordinary care or skill ..• except so far as the latter 
has, wilfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injuries 
upon himself . ••. " (Emphasis added.) Judge Nourse notes 
that "It is clear that there is nothing in the section which 
allows one, who through negligence has injured another, to 
escape liability because someone other than the person injured 
by his negligence contributed to that injury. Yet this is what 
occurs when a defendant tortfeasor is permitted to plead the 
negligence of the decedent in an action for wrongful death 
founded upon Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It 
is the heirs of the decedent who have suffered pecuniary loss, 
who are the persons injured by the act of the tortfeasor. 
Certainly it cannot be said that the widow and minor children 
of a man killed by the negligence of another have, in the 
words of Section 1714, 'wilfully or by want of ordinary care 
brought the injuries' upon themselves." (Emphasis added.) 
Judge Nourse notes that the reasons given for the defense 
of contributory negligence in the decided cases have no appli-
cation to an action for wrongful death. Quoting from PujiS8 
v. Los Angeles Ry. 00., 12 Cal.App. 207, 211 [107 P. 317], 
it appears that "In order that contributory negligence shall 
prevent the recovery of damages for a personal injury, it must 
appear that the negligence is that of the injured person or 
of someone over whom he exercised some control. ... The 
reason for the rule which so relieves the defendant from the 
payment of damages for his negligence where the plaintiff has 
contributed to the injury by his own negligence, as it is 
applied in this state, is based upon an argument of con-
venience, to wit, the impossibility of successfully apportion-
ing the damages between the parties, and not for the reason 
that the law relieves the defendant from responsibility merely 
because the injured party has contributed to the result by 
his own negligence or wrongful act." 
Judge Nourse points out that in an action for wrongful 
death the plaintiffs have brought no injury upon themselves. 
The fact that the person, whose death gives rise to their cause 
of action, has by his own negligence, in some degree "however 
slight" contributed to his own death, is, under the language 
) 
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of the court just quoted, or under the provisions of section 
1714 of the Civil Code of no more moment than the contribut-
ing negligence of some third person. 
An additional distinction between the ordinary tort action 
apd a wrongful death action are the damages recoverable: 
In the ordinary personal injury action, the plaintiff recovers 
for medical expenses, pain or suffering. together with com-
pensatory damages; in a wrongful death action, the heirs may 
recover damages for the injuries they have sustained: loss of 
support, society, comfort and protection. 
Judge Nourse "submits" that the basis for the defense of 
contributory negligence is entirely lacking in an action for 
wrongful death even though the cases dealing with actions 
under section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure have held 
that contributory negligence was a defense. He says that if 
the cases are wrong, this court should not hesitate to overrule 
them. 
I agree with the logic and reasoning set forth by Judge 
Nourse; I feel that the cases holding contributory negligence 
a defense in wrongful death actions are wrong and should be 
overruled and that the error should not be perpetuated as is 
being done in the instant case. 
I also disagree with the majority in its holding that the 
failure of the trial court to obey the clear mandate of section 
601 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not prejudicial error. 
The evidence was in sharp conflict concerning the person 
responsible for the negligence which caused the death of plain-
tiffs' decedent. The jury returned a defendants' verdict. 
We are told by the majority that plaintiffs made no "affirma-
tive showing" that any of the jurors were biased, prejudiced, 
or unfit to serve as jurors. As a matter of fact, it would be 
impossible to tell the effect the juror in querrtion had on the 
adverse verdict returned by the jury. It was also impossible 
for the plaintiffs to show "affirmatively" that the juror in 
question contributed to the loss of the case. The problem 
involved here does not fall under the provisions of section 657, 
subdivision 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and even if 
plaintiffs had produced jurors' affidavits of bias or prejudice 
on the part of the challenged juror it woold have availed 
them nothing. 
It is well settled that affidavits or evidence of any char-
acter concerning the mental attitude of either concurring or 
dissenting jurors which tend to contradict, impeach or defeat 
their verdict are inadmissible. (Murphy v. Go'unty of Lake. 
) 
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106 Cal.App.2d 61 [234 P.2d 712] ; Barrett v. Oity of Olare-
mont, 41 Ca1.2d 70 l256 P.2d 977J; Marino v. Oounty of 
Tuolumne, 118 Cal.App.2d 6751258 P.2d 540] ; Anderson v. 
Oounty of San Joaquin, 110 Cal.App.2d 703 [244 P.2d 75].) 
Even affidavits or testimony of third persons offered to prove 
admissions of jurors to impeach the verdict are not coun-
tenanced. (Noble v. Key System, Ltd., 10 Cal.App.2d 132 
[51 P.2d 887].) In fact, the authorities are uniform to the 
effect that affidavits or oral evidence of either concurring or 
dissenting jurors may not be received to contradict, impeach 
or defeat their verdict, except to show that the verdict was 
secured by chance. (Orabtree v. Western Pac. R. 00.,33 Cal. 
App.2d 35 [90 P.2d 835] ; Johnson v. Gray, 4 Cal.App.2d 72 
[40 P.2d 575] ; Toomes v. Nunes, 24 Cal.App.2d 395 [75 P.2d 
94] ; Phipps v. Patters01l, 27 Cal.App.2d 545 [81 P.2d 437] ; 
Gray v. Robinson, 33 Cal.App.2d 177 [91 P.2d 194].) 
In view of the settled law of this state as announced in 
the foregoing authoriites it is difficult for me to devise a 
means or method whereby appellant could have made a show-
ing of prejudice to his case as the result of the admittedly 
erroneous ruling of the trial court against him. The record 
discloses that he was denied his statutory right to the exercise 
of a peremptory challenge. This the majority concedes. The 
verdict of the jury was against him notwithstanding the 
conceded fact that the evidence was sufficient to support a 
verdict in his favor. Since it was not possible under the rules 
of law above announced for appellant to have made a showing 
as to what took place in the jury room or of the state of mind 
of the juror he sought to challenge, it is obvious that there 
is no basis in law or fact for the statement of the majority 
that appellant was required to make an affirmative showing 
that he was prejudiced as the result of the error committed 
by the trial court in denying appellant his statutory right 
to exercise the peremptory challenge here in question in order 
to obtain a reversal of the judgment. 
In view of the foregoing it is obvious that the approach 
of the majority to the problem here involved is wholly un-
realistic. If the majority is right in this case, then a trial 
judge may announce at the beginning of the trial or at any 
time during the trial that neither party may exercise any 
peremptory challenge, and although an exception is taken to 
the ruUng and either or both parties seek to impose peremptory 
challenges and are denied the right to do so by the court, 
this court could hold that since there is no showing of preju-
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dice by the party against whom the verdict was rendered, a 
judgment r('ndered thereon must be affirmed, thus abrogating 
the statutes which allow peremptory challenges to jurors as 
a matter of right in both civil and criminal cases. I have 
np doubt that every trial lawyer will be shocked to learn 
that such is the law of this state. 
None of the authorities cited in the majority opinion sup-
ports the view expressed therein on this point. In none of 
those cases was a party denied the right to exercise a per-
emptory challenge where he admittedly had the right to impose 
Buch challenge as in the case at bar. It is true that there is 
Bome loose language in some of those cases to the effect that 
where a party challenges the ruling of the trial court with 
respect to the qualifications of a juror, he must make an 
affirmative showing that the ruling of the trial court was 
prejudicial to him, but this is a far cry from holding that 
where the trial court arbitrarily denies a party the statutory 
right to exercise a peremptory challenge, he must in some 
manner not disclosed by the majority opinion here nor in any 
of the authorities cited, make an affirmative showing of preju-
dice in order to obtain a reversal of a judgment entered upon 
a verdict adverse to the party denied such right. 
Because of the prejudicial error committed by the trial 
court in denying plaintiffs their statutory right to a per-
emptory challenge and because I firmly believe that contrib-
utory negligence is not, nor should it be, a defense in a 
wrongful death action, I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November 4, 
1955. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted, and Carter, J., filed the fol-
lowing opinion: 
CARTER, J .-The majority of this court has modified its 
opinion and denied a rehearing in this case notwithstanding 
the fact that the petition for rehearing pointed out that never 
before has an appellate court in this state held that the denial 
of the right to exercise a peremptory challenge is a mere error 
in procedure which may bc cured by the application of 
section 4% of article VI of the Constitution of California and 
that numerous cases holding to the contrary were not even 
mentioned in the majority opinion. As counsel for appellant 
point out in their petition for rehearing there is a long and 
unbroken line of well considered opinions of this court and the 
Dis~ct Courts of Appeal holding squarely that the right te 
) 
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challenge peremptorily is absolute, and not qualified by the 
necessity of showing injury. This rule was reannounced as 
late as July 27th, 1951 in the Mse of People v. Diaz, 105 Cal. 
App.2d 690, 696 [234 P.2d 300] (hearing denied by this 
court without dissenting vote) where the District Court of 
Appeal said: "The denial of the right of peremptory chal-
lenge cannot be said to be a mere matter of procedure. The 
right is absolute. (People v. Helm, 152 Cal. 532, 535 [93 
P. 99].) It is a substantial right. It has been said that 
it is one of the chief safeguards of a defendant against an 
unlawful conviction and that the courts ought to permit 
its freest exercise within the limitation fixed by the Legis-
lature. (People v. Edwards, 101 Cal. 543, 544 [36 P. 7].) 
As said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hayes v. 
Missouri, 120 U. S. 68 [7 8.Ct. 350, 30 L.Ed. 578, 580], 
experience has shown that one of the most effective means to 
free the jury box from persons unfit to be there is the exercise 
of the peremptory challenge. The right may not be abridged 
or denied. Arbitrary abridgment or denial of the right runs 
counter to principles vital to the integrity and maintenance 
of the system of a constitutional right of trial by jury." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Numerous other decisions, quoted in the decisions cited in 
People v. Diaz, supra, reiterate as a constitutional dogma that 
nnder our jury system, the right to peremptory challenge is 
absolute and an "inseparable and inalienable part of the right 
of trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution." 
The majority of the court has recognized this principle in 
theory, but has just as effectively denied it in practice. 
Upon the authority of People v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81 [273 
P. 575], and People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470 [268 P. 909, 270 
P. 1117], this court has qualified the right and requires an 
"affirmative showing" of bias or prejudice. In neither of the 
above cited cases was a party deprived of a peremptory chal-
lenge. These two cases can therefore be no authority or 
precedent for the holding of this court. 
In applying the provision of section 4%, article VI, of 
the California Constitution, which applies to procedural de-
fects, and not to errors of substantive law, this court has 
in effect overruled a number of precedents of this. court 
holding directly to the contrary, that the provisions of section 
41;2, article VI, California Constitution, do not apply where 
the right to peremptory challenge has been abridged. 
In People v. Oarmichael, 198 Cal. 534 [246 P. 62], the 
... ) 
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court, referring to article VI, section 41;2 of the Constitution, 
declared, page 5·17: "It was never intended by this provision 
of the constitution to take from the defendant in a criminal 
action his fundamental right to a jury trial or in any sub-
staptial manner to abridge this right. (People v. Wismer, 
58 Cal.App. 679, 688 [209 P. 259])." 
In People v. lVismer, 58 CaLl\.pp. 679 [209 P. 259], after 
the defendant had exercised all of his peremptory challenges, 
he was compelled to accept a juror who was disqualified by 
reason of actual bias. The court held, page 687: "Section 
4% of article VI of the constitution has no application to the 
situation presented here. The right of trial by jury is funda-
mental-a right which came to us from the common law and 
as such guaranteed by the constitution-and inseparably con-
nected therewith (indeed, it is of the very essence thereof) 
is the right to a trial by a jury consisting of unbiased and 
unprejudiced persons.'J 
In People v. Bennett, 79 Cal.App. 76, the court stated, page 
91 [249 P. 20]: "And it should always be remembered that, 
in the trial of a criminal case, any act or action of a trial 
court which must necessarily have the effect of denying to the 
accused a trial by a fair and impartial jury will not be 
excused or mitigated by the terms of section 4% of article 
VI of the constitution. The right of trial by jury is funda-
mental." 
In People v. O'Oonnor, 81 Cal.App. 506 [254 P. 630], the 
defendant was denied the right to exercise the number of 
peremptory challenges to which he was entitlpd under the 
statute. It was contended that section 4V2 of article VI 
applied. The court said, page 520: "As generally defined 
'procedure' includes in its meaning whatever is embraced 
by the three technical terms, pleading, evidence, and practice. 
(32 Cyc. 405.) Had there been no denial of the exercise 
of any peremptory challenges, we seriously question whether 
t.his section has any application to the cause before us. This 
section must refer to pleading and procedure, as authorized 
by the codes. Thus, to make it applicable to the pleadings. 
had there been any defects ill the informations not affecting 
the substantial rights of the parties, as accorded by law, then, 
and in that case, the error should be held harmless. Likewise, 
if the court omitted to follow the procedure embodied by the 
codes for the arraignment and trial of the defendants upon 
the informations filed against them and had committed some 
error in so doing, which did not affect the substantial rights 
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of the parties, then such error in procedure would likewise 
be held harmless, but, it cannot reasonably be helcl that section 
41/2 of ari1'cle VI is so broad i1l its meaning as to permit the 
trial court to disregard the usual and ordinary p"ocedu,+e in 
the trial of a cause and adopt a new and entirely different 
manner fron/, that recognized by law. Such a course is not a 
mistake in procedure" it is a substitution of procedure. 'What 
would excuse a mistake in procedure would not and could 
'not be held to allow the creation of a course unprovided for 
by law. JHstake is one thing j a substitution is an e'ntirely 
a'ifferent thing." (Emphasis added.) 
It is abundantly clear from the above cited authorities that 
section 4% of article VI, since it relates to procedure, has no 
application where the right to peremptory challenge has been 
interfered with. Yet, the majority here, without citation of 
authority in support of its position holds that simply because 
"the jurors were polled and were unanimous in their verdict" 
the error in denying appellant his right to exercise a peremp-
tory challenge was cured by section 4% of article VI of the 
Constitution. The majority arrives at this conclusion even 
though it concedes that the evidence produced on behalf of 
appellant was amply sufficient to support a verdict and judg-
ment in his favor. 
There can be no question whatsoever that, so far as appears 
from the face of the majority opinion, the conclusion that 
no miscarriage of justice resulted was not based on a review 
of all of the evidence in the case but solely on the ground 
that there was no affirmative showing that any juror who 
served was biased or otherwise unfit. Of course, it is obvious 
from a consideration of the authorities cited in my dissenting 
opinion heretofore filed in this case that such a showing would 
be virtually impossible in view of the law relating to the 
unimpeachability of verdicts. But the majority does not 
attempt to meet this argument, but blindly invokes the pro-
visions of section 4% of article VI of the Constitution because 
the jury was unanimous in its verdict in favor of defendant. 
In so holding, it is obvious that the majority do not appre-
ciate the significance of the right to a peremptory challenge. 
This challenge has always existed in our law and has a very 
salutary purpose. It enables the litigant to remove from the 
jury box a prospective juror who has failed to discloS'e his 
true mental state and who may possess deep seated prejudices 
against the litigant or his case which the prospective juror 
will not admit on voir dire examination. The right to remove 
) 
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such a prospective juror, without disclosing the reason there-
for, is a basic fundamental right guaranteed by the statutes 
of this state and is known and recognized by all trial lawyers 
to be one of the most important safeguards against the selec-
tion of those for jury duty who are disqualified because they 
possess a state of mind adverse to the party exercising the 
challenge which cannot be disclosed by voir dire examination. 
'fhe assumption of the majority that one prejudiced juror 
could not bring about a unanimous verdict against a party 
in the face of satisfactory evidence in his favor when he has 
been denied the right to challenge the prejudiced juror, is not 
borne out by either theory or practical experience. Those who 
have had experience in the trial of jury cases appreciate the 
importance of eliminating from juries those who have pre-
conceived notions as to what result should be reached regard-
less of the evidence, and many tales have been told and more 
remain untold of how one or two overzealous jurors have 
brought about a verdict against the weight of the evidence. 
In this connection I cannot refrain from repeating the warn-
ing I so often heard from my venerable father that one rotten 
apple will spoil the whole barrel. While this was applied to 
an occasional bad boy in the community, it is just as applicable 
to jurors or other small groups. 
It is traditional in our judicial system tbat the jury selected 
to try a case should be fair and impartial. 'fhe Legislature 
has endeavored to prescribe a system for the selection of 
juries which will as nearly as possible guarantee to litigants 
a jury composed of fair and impartial persons. This court 
has helJ unanimously ill this case that the system provided 
by the Legislature for the selection of juries was not followed 
in this case. That there was a substantial departure from the 
system so prescribed there can be no question. Such being 
the case, the plaintiff was not accorded the type of jury trial 
guaranteed by the laws of this state. The majority concedC1l 
that this was error. There is only one way to cure this error 
and that is to grant plaintiff a new trial. To do otherwise is 
to deny to plaintiff the equal and exact justice to which he is 
entitled, by the verdict of a jury impartially selected, which 
Thomas Jefferson declared to be one of the principles which 
"form the bright cOllstella tion which has Gone be£Ol'e us." 
(First Inaugural Addr~, March 4, 1S01.) 
